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The century-long debate over the merits of capitalism and socialism
(it does, I know, seem longer) has begun to bore everyone. Few be-
lieve much of it and no one believes all of it, from the virtues of
untrammeled private enterprise to the benevolence of state bureau-
cracies. Some will do almost anything to get away from it, from re-
inventing Karl Marx (the young, the old, the middle-aged, the ro-
mantic, the humanist, even the Marxist) to rediscovering Adam
Smith (the professor of moral philosophy, the anti-businessman, the
critic of alienation, the friend of the workingman). The boredom is
a clue to the belief that thought and action on these matters no longer
bear any discernible relationship.
If the truth were told, ideologies are nowadays as fissiparous as gov-
ernments. One side is not so much enamored of private life as dis-
enchanted with government. The other does not so much worship
public policy as fear private oppression. Both sides know what they
do not like better than what they do. In fact, the defender and critic
of capitalism have more in common than they realize, for although
one loves markets and the other hates markets, both are fascinated
by them. It is, after all, the morality of markets-do they enhance
or obfuscate popular preferences?-and not their efficacy that is at
issue. Even among socialists, whose hostility to private power remains
fierce, dismay at the performance of big government (more in pri-
vate conversation than public announcement) runs deep. There is
therefore new room these days for maneuvering along the edges of
ideologies.
Into the interstices between capitalism and socialism comes a con-
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cern with corporations. Without them, efficient modern enterprise
appears unrealistic, and with them comes a potential for unbridled
power. Unwilling either to abolish corporations or allow them to
function freely, modern democracies have spawned half-way houses,
from regulation to nationalization, none of which seems as satisfactory
as it did a quarter century ago.
Today, when both the friends and enemies of democracy take aim
at our sometimes faltering system, it is more important than ever that
new, alternative modes of social and economic activity be examined.
This is the most important message in Politics and Markets-that
by keeping our options open, by examining (though not necessarily
advocating) paths seldom trod, we may find it possible to build a
more humane alternative to our present system. Through his insightful
analysis and original speculations, C. E. Lindblom has extended
scholarly debate beyond current frontiers.
Yet when we draw conclusions about so complex and mutable a
phenomenon as society, the sad truth is that we are usually mistaken.
We must therefore safeguard our capacity, not only to move society
forward, but also to change it back. To discuss that capacity properly,
1 shall need to introduce terms seldom heard in the debate over
capitalism and democracy: terms like diversity, reversibility, error
recognition, and error correction. With these terms in hand, I shall
conclude this review entirely in the spirit of Lindblom's search for
a bedrock view of political economy, suggesting different criteria
for evaluating answers to the questions he has raised.
I. Politics and Markets-An Overview
Politics and Markets is the most intellectually interesting contribu-
tion to American radical thought since that of Randolphe Bourne, who
wrote around the first World 'War. It is radical in its description-
corporate capitalism is incompatible with democracy; in its prescrip-
tion-to sever markets from private enterprise in the service of social
equality and environmental purity; and in its analytic opposition of
society conceived of as a single mind whose intellectual elites choose
the one correct policy for all, as in command economy and bureaucratic
planning, to society conceived of as innumerable and diverse minds
interacting to arrive at agreed policies, as in political bargaining and
market transactions.
In this remarkable book, Lindblom parades the world's political
and economic systems before us with fine precision and the benefit
of his critical eye. He knows that "[i]n unobscured view, no society
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looks defensible," some for choking off liberty, others for crippling
equality, all for denying fraternity." Yet his radicalism, his enormous
effort to take a fundamental view of things, is at the same time op-
timistic in a way that only American thought can be. Like the framers
of the Constitution, who acted on the then (and perhaps still) in-
credible view that mankind could devise the institutions by which
they would govern themselves, and like the founders of the great
American foundations, who believed that it was actually possible to
get at the root causes of social phenomena and thereby to accomplish
social change, Lindblom affirms that "the decline of the human con-
dition is not inevitable. It is for us to decide .... The world is man's
doing, not something done to him."2 So he asks, "[W]hat are the
fundamental politico-economic mechanisms they can employ in order
to maintain-indeed greatly enlarge-the humane qualities of life on
Earth?"3
Lindblom argues that corporations are antithetical to democracy
because their privileged position in the economy, coupled with their
special status in the polity, is not subject to basic challenge. Yet he
knows too much to want to abolish corporations altogether. Lindblom,
a lifelong student of socially interactive models of problem solving,
is not a proponent of statism, of gigantism, or of the comprehensive
centralized cognition called comprehensive planning in which so-
ciety operates as if everyone had compatible interests. Easy solutions
-those assuming benevolence and omniscience-are out for him. What,
then, to do? Lindblom's seminal contribution is to achieve a more
radical conceptual separation of markets from private enterprise, of
supply from demand, than has heretofore been thought possible. This
separation, fraught with consequences, is a milestone in the history
of social thought. Raising radical social thought from the mire of
wrong-headed opposition to markets for any and all purposes, Lind-
blom encourages use of their marvelous calculating power in a radi-
cally new way.
II. Who is to Blame?
"I am frightened for my country after seeing this demonstration
of corporate power." (Esther Peterson, President Carter's con-
sumer affairs adviser, after defeat of a bill to establish a consumer
agency.) 4




4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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"Businessmen have to be radicals now, because they're the out-
siders." (Daniel Popeo, general counsel of the Washington Foun-
dation, a business-supported public interest foundation.)5
"Relentlessly accumulating evidence," Lindblom tells us, "suggests
that human life on the planet is heading for a catastrophe."6 We
threaten to "raise Earth's temperature to a level unsuitable for hu-
man habitation ... end human life or reduce it to unbearable squalor
S.. plunder the planet of resources, or burn ourselves from the face
of the earth."7 So much for Mother Nature.
According to Lindblom, the social scene is not much more promis-
ing. "In the United States, many citizens fear that social problems
are running far ahead of government. Many of our children do not
learn to read. Jobs are insecure. Money does not hold its value. On
some days the air is not fit to breathe. The streets are not safe."8 And
there is always the bomb-the likelihood of an accident, if not a
nuclear war. Nor is that all. "[G]reat wealth still leaves a segment
of the population in a demoralizing welfare system .... Its expensive
legal system is open to the rich, inaccessible to the poor for civil
law, and hostile to the poor in criminal law . . . . [B]usiness lead-
ers . . .practice bribery of government . . . [and] defraud their
customers . . .
This is quite an indictment, and yet if we seek odious comparisons
for solace, Lindblom stops us short. Communist systems, he says, share
with us a humanitarian vision, albeit imperfectly realized. Murder of
millions no more denies their humanitarian aspirations, in his opinion,
than the atomic bombing of Japan, the bombing of civilians in Ger-
many, or the havoc wrought in Vietnam denies ours. Is this fair? How
can Lindblom equate our defense with their offense? "[B]oth groups
of leaders," he replies, "claim to kill for humanitarian principles."' 1
Does Lindblom not appreciate the accomplishments of liberal de-
mocracy? Of course he does. "In human history," he writes, "the de-
sign of large national governments practicing a nonviolent compe-
tition for authority in such a way that men can be free, as liberals
define freedom, is as great an accomplishment as man has ever
achieved."" But the very first sentence of Politics and Markets un-
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dercuts this crutch of self-congratulation, treating liberty as an "aside"
to get to the analytic heart of the consequences of social choice. "Aside
from the difference between despotic and libertarian governments,
the greatest distinction between one government and another is in
the degree to which market replaces government or government re-
places market."' 2 Thus, the argument to which Lindblom devotes the
bulk of his book is unexceptional: the operation of government, and
the actions of those who seek to influence it, depend critically "on
the role of the market in political-economic life."'13 The blind spot
in this book, to which I shall return, is the converse proposition: the
operation of markets (and therefore corporations) depends critically
on the role of government in economic life. What corporations do to
government, to reverse the flow of causality, may be dependent on
what government does to (or for) them.
More than any contemporary social scientist, more, perhaps, than
anyone since Adam Smith and Karl Marx (who were, in different
ways, fascinated by the immense calculating powers of social inter-
action), C.E. Lindblom has contributed to our understanding of how
coordination is possible without a coordinator, not only in economic,
but also in political life. No one has done more to unearth the ad-
vantage that numerous minds interacting have over a single one act-
ing out their parts for them. And whereas before, in his pioneering
work with Robert Dahl-Politics, Economics and Welfare,14 he
divided processes of calculation into hierarchy, prices, bargaining,
and polyarchy (political competition), now, in an important simpli-
fication and clarification, he distinguishes more sharply between uni-
lateral and multilateral controls, recognizing that all of these processes
except hierarchy represent forms of mutual adjustment.
A. The Corporation is to Blame
Of the two main methods of economic adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances-new mutually advantageous exchanges and unilateral ter-
mination of an exchange relationship-Lindblom judges the second
(losing a job, being forced to leave a community) to be as injurious
to liberty as punishment by legal command. Though law prohibits
many types of injuries, and even threats of injury, "it leaves one great
exception: termination of an exchange relation," "one to which clas-
sical liberal theory seems blind."'1 Lindblom of course knows that
12. P. ix.
13. Id.
14. R. DAHL 8- C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 169-365 (1953).
15. P. 48.
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markets could not continue if exchanges were compulsory. He is calling
attention to the hidden damage done by apparently pure market pro-
ceedings. Pain as well as gain is exchanged.
There is, to be sure, another side of the story. Markets increase
productivity, thus making it possible for both sides to come out better
off. They do so, however, only if they choose the best (or, at least,
better) alternative use of resources. It is precisely because of their
"impersonal" and "soulless" character, to employ the standard epi-
thets, precisely because they do not care about you and me as people
but only about our economic contribution, that they are able to
discard the old and worse for the new and better. If markets were
socially conscious, valuing need over contribution, or merit over re-
sults, economic surpluses would be distributed before they could be
accumulated, and a bureaucratic authority would be required to de-
fine and recognize need and merit. Either way, people get hurt, whether
from a lack of compassion or from an excess of it. Like every other
instrument of policy, markets are neither good for everything nor
good for nothing.
Concerned as he is about vetoes in market transactions, Lindblom
is all the more worried about their prevalence in politics. How can
there be collective solutions to problems, he asks, when those affected
can stop progress? This is an old story. Veto-groups have long been
bemoaned by those in favor of the latest reform; vetoes have also
been applauded by those opposed to change as manifesting the fore-
sight of the founders of the Republic, who cleverly constructed sep-
arated powers, armed them with checks and balances, and surrounded
all with a redundant federal structure so that nothing not widely
approved (at least by those who participated) could become law. The
problem of vetoes has acquired urgency because, in Lindblom's view,
the traditional distributional issues have been superseded by more
serious collective concerns-peace, environment, energy. As to these
a "failure of policy making leaves the entire society in peril. One
person's loss is now every person's loss .... A veto of a solution to a
collective problem-say, of an energy policy-may put society on the
road to catastrophe."'' 1 It is not the opportunities for vetoes inherent
in our governmental structure that disturb Lindblom, however, but
his judgment that "[t]he foundation of these vetoes is largely the au-
tonomy of the business enterprise."' 17 Its legally protected "right to
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mits it to obstruct policies such as those on environmental pollution
and decay, energy shortage, inflation and unemployment, and dis-
tribution of income and wealth.... [B]usinessmen need do no more
than persuade government that reforms will damage business. Their
vetoes are powerful and ubiquitous." '
Corporations, according to Lindblom, suffer from that inescapable
affliction, guilt by definition. It is not so much that they conspire
(or even aspire) to do evil, but that, in a democracy, they must be
evil. Business, so to speak, is incorporated with Original Sin, for as
an essential part of the economy it is necessarily privileged, and privi-
lege is incompatible with popular rule.
By privilege, Lindblom does not mean acts morally improper for
individuals, but rather benefits unequally distributed in society. Lind-
blom's list of privileges is a lengthy one-money, propaganda, ex-
pertise, access to government, and more, much more-but it all adds
up to one, the performance of essential economic functions. Busi-
nessmen play a more privileged part in government than anyone,
except possibly government officials, because "jobs, prices, produc-
tion growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of every-
one all rest in their hands."'19 In short, the business of government is
the economy, and the economy is run by business. Since private proper-
ty cannot be compelled to act, Lindblom explains, it must be of-
fered inducements-"income and wealth, deference, prestige, influence,
power, and authority, among others."2 0 Whenever corporations say
that they need this or that subsidy or tax concession in order to assure
the profits necessary for employment and growth, they are likely to
be indulged because employment and growth are what government
wants too.
Would Lindblom say, then, that business runs government? No, he
is not a vulgar Marxist. He only says that business is uniquely and
disproportionately privileged. But surely there are other important
interests, such as agriculture and labor unions, that can compete with
business for political power. Not so, says Lindblom, at least not to
the same degree. Workers and farmers have to work, but businessmen
do not have to risk capital; moreover, if these other interests were
to grow much stronger they could "undercut the entrepreneurial ener-
gies on which market-oriented systems depend." 21 Back to the double-
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enterprise long before it is great enough to match the privileged
position of business."
22
Why say business is privileged when the vast majority of citizens
support private enterprise? Because, Lindblom argues, the surest proof
of privilege is that business can convince others to want what it wants
or, more importantly, not to want what it does not want. Lindblom
urges us to consider
the ominous specific possibility that popular control in both mar-
ket and government is in any case circular. It may be that people
are indoctrinated to demand-to buy and to vote for-nothing
other than what the decisionmaking elite is already disposed to
grant them. The volitions that are supposed to guide leaders are
formed by the same leaders.23
Opinion molding runs from "unconscious conditioning.., to believe
in... fundamental institutions" and "child-rearing practices that stress
individualistic autonomy" to "the competitiveness of sports [coming
to be] identified with market life,"'2 4 the indoctrinating of "citizens
to overlook their privileged position," and the association of "private
enterprise with political democracy. ' 25 If indoctrination is so success-
ful, one wonders why business has to fight or how it ever loses.
What of the obvious fact that business does not always get what
it says that it wants from government? Lindblom does not deny that
business sometimes loses; he just denies that this occasional loss sig-
nifies what at first glance it seems to about the power of business over
government. Often, he argues, business gets what it wants without
even asking because every government depends on a sound economy,
and sometimes what appears to be persuasion by business is really
coercion, such as when a plea for tax relief implies that corporations
will cut investment with unfortunate consequences for everyone. To
Lindblom,
[i]t follows that evidence, which is abundant, of conflict between
business and government-and of business defeats-is not evidence
of lack of privilege. Knowing that they must have some privileges
and knowing that government officials fully understand that
simple fact, businessmen ask for a great deal. They also routinely
protest any proposal to reduce any of their privileges. They are
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might weaken them in governmental negotiations to do so. Hence
they often predict dire consequences when a new regulation is
imposed on them, yet thereafter quickly find ways to perform
under it.2-0
"Businessmen," he concludes, "thus become a kind of public of-
ficial and exercise . . . public functions.1 27 Whereas other interests
appear as special pleaders, business appears imbued with the public
interest in a strong economy. And this unmatched power over gov-
ernment "is inevitable in all private enterprise systems if they are to
be viable. ' 28 This is the Catch-22 of corporate privilege: If corpora-
tions get what they want, that is bad for democracy; but "when they
do not, recession or stagnation is a consequence. '29 Moreover, there
is a favored class that participates much more effectively than the
lower class, a favored class that occupies leadership positions in major
interest groups.30 "Thus," Lindblom concludes, "the very groups that
might challenge class influences in the system are themselves class
influenced." 2' Is this the classical Marxist explanation of capitalist
control based on false consciousness? According to Lindblom, it is
not "quite the same." "To say that, because of class, bourgeois de-
mocracy is wholly a sham because the masses are mistaken about what
they want, which is roughly what Marx said, is different from saying
that because of class, popular control is crippled though not paralyzed
by circularity. The latter is our conclusion." -2  If this differentiation
is designed to let through a ray of hope, it does not succeed.
B. Can a Corporation Be a Good Citizen?
How could the proposition that corporate privileges are incom-
patible with democracy be put to the test? How might it be squared
with the opposing assertion that the prerogatives of corporations are
being whittled down as they are compelled to provide a variety of
social services opposed to their profit-making purposes? How, in-
deed, square the two quotations that headline this Part, one saying
that corporations cannot be beaten and the other suggesting that they
are taking a terrible beating?









The Yale Law Journal
proached by asking whether concrete manifestations of corporate
power are actually to be found. One place Lindblom located them
is in the alleged corporate veto over major matters of collective con-
cern. Do such vetoes exist? They do and they do not. Unless cor-
porations are to lose on every try, they must stop some things that
they do not like; since they are often divided on subjects such as
free trade and oil prices, some corporations must veto, and some fail
to veto, some of the time. Actually, there are an enormous number
of vetoes in our political system, creating a mirage of obstruction
when there is really momentous movement. How? Suppose that only
one percent of initiatives were approved. If the rate of initiation
quadrupled, then for each successful policy before the quadrupling
we would see three more successes, but we would also see three hundred
more vetoes. In the past decade, because of the popularity of social
policies, this pattern-many more policies accompanied by an even
greater number of vetoes-has accompanied the growth of the welfare
state.
The single noteworthy example of mutual veto is energy policy.
Years after the enormous increase in oil prices, which feeds inflation,
decreases employment, depresses the stock market, ruins the dollar,
proliferates arms to oil producers, and more, the official policy is
still to subsidize the price of oil. Why? Is this another example of
corporate privilege? Hardly; it shows again the difficulties of gov-
ernment trying to substitute for markets instead of mitigating their
consequences. Government should have deregulated natural gas and
allowed the price of oil to rise to the international level, thus re-
flecting real scarcities, while simultaneously subsidizing those who
suffered the most. Unfortunately, the task of making all adjustments
at once has proven too much for Congress, so that there is neither
choice by politics nor choice through markets.
If the ultimate test of corporate privilege is survival, corporations
can only test the null hypothesis by committing suicide. Short of
the ultimate sacrifice, one way to test Lindblom's hypothesis of in-
evitable corporate privilege would be by trying out more meliorative
devices for modifying behavior deemed objectionable. Suppose our
aim is to lessen corporate interest in (and hence efforts to gain con-
trol over) government. One policy proposal, which is receiving serious
attention today, is to end corporate taxation by having the same taxes
paid by the individuals to whom profits are distributed. Much busi-
ness interest lies in reducing taxes, which would be less necessary if
there were no taxation to escape. A second proposal would be an end
to all or most policies that set prices. The further government is re-
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moved from corporate profits, the less corporations will be tempted
to abuse government. There would have been no "milk deal," for
example, if the government were not in the business of setting the
price of milk, and there would be less need to conduct campaigns
against regulation of rates if there were not so much of it. In a de-
mocracy one cannot have it both ways-government control over an
industry and no effort by industry to exert control over government.
III. What's the Solution?
If you believe that the largest "institutional barrier to fuller de-
mocracy may... be the autonomy of the private corporation,"33 and
if you also believe, as Lindblom has maintained throughout his schol-
arly life, that comprehensive planning to arrive at correct decisions
for society is "a fruitless effort,"34 what do you recommend? Without
corporations there cannot be modern business, without business there
cannot be markets, and without markets decisionmaking cannot be
decentralized. How, then, does one reconcile a lifelong love of social
interaction with an antagonism toward the political consequences of
the major economic mechanism for decentralized decisionmaking?
Lindblom wants us to consider this answer: private markets for pro-
duction, political arenas for consumption. What is to be produced is
to be decided centrally, presumably through political mechanisms,
but how it is to be produced is to be left to private enterprise. The
(in)famous marriage of supply and demand is to be annulled.
Lindblom thus reverses the terms of the famous debate between
Oscar Lange and Ludwig von Mises over the (im)possibility of com-
bining nationalization of production with individuality of consump-
tion.35 The author wants us to think about nationalization of con-
sumption, not production. In his own words,
[o]bviously, therefore, government purchases can direct produc-
tion as surely as can consumer purchases. A planner sovereignty
market system is one in which they do so. Government directs
production by purchases of final products rather than by com-
mands. Such a system is a possibility yet unrealized for the central
planning of an entire economy.
In the fullest form of planner sovereignty, all production, con-
sumer goods included, would be guided by the purchases of a
33. P. 356.
34. P. 346.
35. See Lange, Ott the Economic Theory of Socialism (pt. 1), 4 REV. ECON. STUDS. 53,
53-57 (1936), reprinted in ON TuE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM 57 (B. Lippincott cd.
1939).
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government that has displaced the consumer as the "sovereign."
All enterprises would sell either to government officials, who de-
cide what consumers should have; or they would sell intermediate
products to other firms that would in turn sell to government
officials instead of individual consumers. Government authority
would direct the allocation of resources and the productive pro-
cesses by buying or not buying final products, or by buying more
or less of them; it would not use authoritative assignments of
targets and quotas.
Government planning would be limited to the desired assort-
ment of final outputs. Through exchange all other production
would be subordinated to those final outputs. Government would
signal for shoe production, for example, by increasing its pur-
chase of shoes; but how the shoes are produced, with what inter-
mediate products, what machinery or buildings are used, what
employees are hired-all that would be left to the enterprises to
decide and arrange through markets.3 6
There is no mistaking the message: Consumers are not to be allowed
to buy directly from producers "[b]ecause [government] officials want
outputs different from those which consumers would buy if left to
themselves. '37 There would be two separate markets and prices: one
for controlling consumption and the other for controlling production.
Presumably, government would act as a cooperative of buyers. To
separate markets from private enterprise, therefore, is to substitute
citizens acting politically through government officials for citizens
acting economically through business in determining who shall con-
sume how much of which goods. Naturally, one wonders whether
government is doing so well that it ought to take on vast new re-
sponsibilities: could government stand the strain?
A. Will Control of Consumption Improve Public Policy?
How would a change from economic to political control of con-
sumption deal with the difficulties that Lindblom says affect this
country? Let us consider medical services, pollution, and crime.
In recent decades, health rates (morbidity and mortality) have been
56. P. 98. It would be fair to say that Lindblom only alludes to a system of planner
sovereignty through markets; he does not, strictly speaking, advocate it or even work
out its implications. How, for instance, is quality control to be handled? If producers
reduce prices and government still refuses to buy, is there still a price s)stem? These and
similar issues are deliberately not addressed. For my purposes in this review, however,
it is desirable to create a contrast between existing relations of corporations to govern-
ment and two alternative relationships: increasing corporate contact with government as
the body that controls consumption (his planner sovereignty) and decreasing corporate
contact by replacing regulation with competition.
87. P. 99.
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improving for all groups in the country, with the possible exception
of white, upper-middle-class males; nevertheless, the medical system
is said to be in a crisis because the cost of care has skyrocketed. Why?
In the choice between increasing access to medical service, improving
its quality, and lowering its costs, the last of these has always lost. As
private insurance becomes more comprehensive, and as medicaid for
the poor and medicare for the elderly expand, the combination of
private insurance and public subsidy, coupled with more intensive
use, drive up the cost of factor prices. A dramatic improvement in
access is accompanied by a huge increase in cost. What could a gov-
ernment that controlled consumption do about this medical inflation?
It could ration access to medicine, as the British do, by setting a
ceiling on total expenditure and investment and making people wait
for their operations. Alternatively, to maintain access and quality, it
could subsidize medicine still further, as the Swedes do, by decreasing
direct costs to individuals while vastly increasing state expenditures.
(Sweden has a higher rate of medical inflation than the United States.)
In any event, health rates depend ultimately on health habits, which
no government, after instituting basic public health measures, has
been able to modify. Unless it is intended that governments lower
the quality of care or reduce access to medicine, political control of
medical consumption will neither lessen expenditures nor affect health
(as opposed to medicine).
Environmental measures, to be sure, might improve health, but
what is the likelihood that more of them would be taken by a gov-
ernment that controlled consumption (a consumocracy?) than are
taken now? As things stand today, public spending is exceeded by
the private spending mandated by regulation, the latter diffused over
tens of millions of taxpayers and consumers. Would a government in
total charge-a government responsible for trading off not only em-
ployment, inflation, welfare, and all the rest, but also the amounts
and sorts of goods that will be produced-spend as much as we al-
ready do on environmental protection? I doubt it.
As for crime, no country in the world, so far as we know, has been
able to lower rates of criminal recidivism without employing inhu-
mane tactics. Early optimism that crime might be eradicated by edu-
cation has long since been abandoned. As long as education was con-
fined to the willing and able, teaching was tolerable. But it turned
out that there was no technology for significantly improving the cog-
nitive abilities of deprived children in a short time. In this respect,
the major difference between the United States and other countries
is that we publicize our failures and they do not.
229
The Yale Law Journal
In sum, difficulties with health, public safety, education, and the
environment are unlikely to be alleviated by a systemic change so
long as the system is still largely responsible to popular will. For all
we know, certain difficulties, such as crime, may yet worsen as we
collectively put in either too little or too much for our own good.
Besides, two of these spheres of policy, education and criminal justice,
are, for the most part, already subject to public control of consump-
tion, while two others, medicine and the environment, are subject to
immense intervention. In short, it does not appear that more of the
same will leave us better off.
B. Who Will Control Government When Government
Controls Consumption?
It can be argued that by eliminating business advertising, govern-
ment control of consumption will liberate men's minds from indoc-
trination into a consuming culture. That indoctrination exists, no one
can deny. None of us can jump out of our skins, free of influence
from surrounding social forces. Yet we know that advertising is often
unsuccessful. Most new businesses and new products fail. They must,
for they compete with one another for limited resources. Most initia-
tives for new public policies also fail. Once established, however,
new government agencies and their programs last for a long time.
Government is better at addition than subtraction. Why?
It is no put-down of democratic government to observe that its
conclusions follow from its premises. Government is representative;
therefore there must be something for everyone. Government governs
by consent; therefore nothing can be taken out without putting some-
thing back in. Government is benevolent; therefore no one category
of citizens can be deprived of any existing benefit. This is the origin
of the aptly-named "hold harmless" provisions of most legislation that
guarantee against declines in levels of benefits. It follows that in or-
der to introduce or change a program, there must be higher levels
of benefits overall so that both old and new beneficiaries are better
off. The inevitable result is an increase in the total level of activity.
Size gives governmental employees a greater direct stake in gov-
ernment than almost anyone else. The indexing of civil service pen-
sions against inflation in Britain (thus protecting the governors against
the consequences of their own actions), and the exemption of federal
employees from the duty of contributing to social security in the
United States (which necessitated such high increases in rates) are
but two exami.'. rur this reason Ignatius Donnelly's populist utopia,
Caesar's Column (set, as luck would have it, in Uganda), specifically
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deprived government employees of the right to vote so long as they
held office.3
8
Government is optimistic; it claims more economic growth than is
conceivable. It estimates expenditures low and revenues high. It adopts
the Keynesian full-employment concept under which government bud-
gets are considered balanced only when deficits are high enough to
promote full employment. And it does all these things so as to carry
higher levels of spending without appearing to carry higher deficits.
Inflation is not the intention, only the result. The intention is to
justify governmental spending as preferable to private consumption,
i.e., to elevate politics above markets.
There is a denial of common humanity involved in insisting that
people's preferences are perverse. Now we all know that we may be
and probably often are mistaken about what is good for us, but if
we are not entitled to want what we want when we want it, we shall
have no new experiences to help change our minds except those that
others think are good for us. To deprive people of their preferences
is to deprive them of their most human property-their right to be
wrong.
The most attractive feature of corporations is their capacity for
failure. They keep score. When they lose, they have to leave, unless,
of course, government rescues them. The trouble with failing is that
it can happen to anyone, and few therefore willingly take risks. Pri-
vate enterprise, if it could, would choose guaranteed profits. Why
not divide a market with competitors, for instance, or substitute gov-
ernment rates for price competition so that everyone gets something,
rather than risk getting nothing? Competition is less an individual
trait than a systemic quality, forced on unwilling individuals so long
as they have no other alternative. The idea that most businessmen
love competition is contrary to experience: they compete because they
must, not because they wish. This hypothesis is tested whenever busi-
nessmen serve on committees to design optimal metropolitan services.
Almost never do they recommend further fragmentation of govern-
ment, coupled with contracting out to private companies, which would
simulate and stimulate private markets. Almost always they replicate
the bureaucratic structures in which they work by recommending con-
solidation of services in a larger governmental framework. Business
should not be allowed to escape from competition through attach-
ment to government. Yet that is what will happen if government
becomes the sole consumer.
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If Eisenhower's military-industrial complex, in which government
is the sole consumer, were expanded to encompass all production,
the incentive for corporations to colonize government would be ir-
resistible.39 Instead of government being of concern only when it im-
pinges on profits, government would be a full-time fascination for
business, the all-consuming object of corporate desire. Instead of poli-
tics being the handmaiden of profits, politics would be the ultimate
(and only) consummation of economic activity. Corporations would
be by necessity what Lindblom accuses them of being by choice-the
privileged class of American politics; otherwise, they literally would
be unable to exist. Corporations would either control governmental
personnel and policies or be controlled by them.
The attraction would work in both directions. Once government
controlled consumption, it would also want to control production.
The process would be inexorable-from deciding what should be con-
sumed to regulating how it should be produced. Once government
agencies were made responsible for consumption, they would have to
regulate production, for consumption depends on quality, depend-
ability, and all the rest. Where consumption had been rendered pre-
dictable by law, production would also have to be protected from
the rigors of competition. The marriage of convenience between gov-
ernment and business would then be blessed by law as well as by
custom.
IV. A Corporate Ecology
In a democracy, citizens owe their country, not only consent, but
also criticism. By delving deeply into fundamental issues, by refusing
to allow an easy exit, Politics and Markets compels its readers to face
up to the premises and promises of democratic government. The least
a reviewer can do in return is to try to carry the discussion further.
How, then, should the economy be related to the polity? What
should a free people want to make of their political economy? How,
to be precise, should government relate to the corporation?
Building on Lindblom, we can say that democracy is less concerned
with correct than with correctable decisions. Dictatorships, on the
other hand, are little concerned with correctability either because they
cannot admit their errors, or because there is no one around to point
them out. Democracies are less concerned with avoiding error, which
is inevitable if no one has sole possession of the truth, than with de-
39. See generally Nieburg, R & D and the Contract State: Throwing Away the Yard-
stick, BULL. ATomic SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1966, at 20-21.
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tecting and correcting error. Their mechanisms, therefore, are de-
signed to find fault. What criteria are appropriate in evaluating the
institutions of such an error-prone, error-recognizing, and error-de-
tecting society?
Reversibility must rank high. Since the truth is yet to be discovered,
irreversible actions are rejected; that is, changing forward is valued
only if the option of changing back is preserved. Diversity is also
treasured. Since the main hypothesis of democracy is that we are likely
to be mistaken, diverse sources of ideas are cultivated to provide new
and competitive hypotheses. Accountability is essential so that citizens
can learn whom to hold responsible and officials can learn what they
are responsible for. Accountability in turn requires differentiation
of function so that what is done may be attributed to who is doing
it. All three criteria-reversibility, diversity, accountability-are quali-
ties through which democratic skepticism is maintained and reinforced.
Every system requires protection against its own excesses; it must
dampen down its extreme tendencies lest it oscillate out of control.
But if there is to be error detection and correction, criticism must be
safeguarded. Thus, while democracies are skeptical, they cannot do
without some dogma. Criticism of criticism is disfavored-the system
must reject (not pay serious attention to) those who reject the system
-because, otherwise, its rationale would be undermined. Rversibility
would become an impossibility, except by force, because criticism of
the new order would be prohibited. There could be one change for-.
ward but no more changes back. Reversibility would be ruined by a
collapse of corporations. Where, for example, would those who wished
to change back find the resources with which to challenge those who
controlled all the resources? There would be less reluctance to ex-
periment with central planning of production if there were better rea-
sons to believe that it could be abandoned.
Democracies are based on skepticism, not dogma. Thus their pro-
cedures are more concerned with removing governments from office
than with keeping them there. Democracy is not about affirmation,
but about negation; it is not commendation, but criticism that is in-
stitutionalized. The right to say "yes," therefore, is valued less than
the rights to say "no," to vote against, to travel elsewhere, and even
to withdraw. But to withdraw, there must be a place to go. In re-
lation to the public sector, private enterprise is part of the sanctuary
of private life. But where would anyone go if they were disaffected
with government? Home and hearth are not enough unless they are
sustained by interests that (a) believe in their own privacy and (b)
are capable of defending it. However imperfectly, corporations meet
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these criteria. The alternative is seeking succor within the bureau-
cracy, which is not necessarily the best place to hide.
It might make sense for a socialist country to add an element of
diversity by removing control of production from government and
returning it to private enterprise. It would not make sense for a
(more or less) capitalist country to give up an element of diversity
that it already possesses. Of the countries in the world today that
are capitalist, none is wholly so and all are getting less so. American
exceptionalism hardly lies in statism; everyone else in the world is
doing that. Perhaps the world gene pool of institutions would be
enriched by maintaining a few examples of that vanishing breed,
corporatus Americanus, as a source of future diversity, before variety
is extinguished from world economic ecology. Existing sources of di-
versity should be safeguarded. Like any other endangered species,
the capitalist corporation should be protected.
Accountability would also disappear if private markets succumbed,
for how will stockholders, consumers, and employees hold business
accountable for its product if government is ordering the goods? How
will citizens hold government accountable if its activities are so nu-
merous and varied as to defy comprehension? It would be far better
to increase differentiation (and hence intelligibility and accountability)
by narrowing the scope of corporate activity to more strictly economic
concerns, and by focusing and thereby reinvigorating competition.
Continuation of administered prices and division of markets by gov-
ernment regulation is probable, but not inevitable. And for those
whose style suggests that radical is right, there could hardly be a more
radical departure from world trends than to try competition. If
America is to be an exception in the world, it could become excep-
tionally competitive.
The debate over capitalism and socialism, markets and politics, has
been conducted mainly by people who are more certain that they
know what is right than they should be. Lindblom's masterwork is
evidence that it is still possible to learn. Before the era of big gov-
ernment, it was still possible to believe that if only government did
this or that-provided aid to education, medical care to the poor and
elderly, built highways, etc.-all would be well. Now we know better,
and as modem, self-conscious people, we cannot pretend that we do
not. Yet the egalitarian dogma of democracy, that political liberty
and social justice can go together, remains to be realized. The test
of the times is to make this new skepticism about government serve
the old ideal of perfecting American democracy.
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